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TOLLING THE FINAL BELL: WILL PUBLIC SCHOOL DOORS
REMAIN OPEN TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
Ross PaineMasler*
"It's all in the name, 'Lamb's Chapel.' It sounds like a Supreme Court case."
That was the response of a lawyer friend when I asked in preparation for writing
this article: "Why did the Court take this case? What is the importance of this decision?"2 Of course my friend was being facetious, but after reviewing the Court's
decision and examining the case's relative importance, I'm beginning to believe
that there may be some truth to that remark. 3
The Court itself speaks on the subject: "Because the holding below was questionable under our decisions, we granted the petition for certiorari. . . ."' While
there is certainly some truth to that statement, it does not seem to answer the question of why this particular case was chosen when so few petitions for certiorari are
granted. 5 There is no broad rule of law which emerges from Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District,' nor is there any significant pronouncement on or clarification of the Court's public forum doctrine.'
Thus, the question remains: What is the importance of the Supreme Court's
Lamb's Chapel decision? Is it simply that the Court disagreed with a lower court
ruling and sought to rectify a perceived injustice? This Article will attempt to provide an answer. The answer will begin with an examination of the Supreme
Court's free speech "forum analysis" doctrine, 8 as that was the approach utilized
by the Court in resolving the issue in Lamb's Chapel.9 Next, this Article will

* Author of Brief of Respondents in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 113 S.Ct.
2141 (1993), Associate Attorney in the law firm of Fiedelman & Hoefling, Jericho, New York. The Author
would like to gratefully acknowledge the editorial assistance of John W. Hoefling, Esq., Andrew Zajac, Esq., and
Susan E. Lysaght, as well as the gracious support of Fiedelman & Hoefling, Esqs. in providing the author with
the time and means needed to complete this article.
1.Interview with Richard E. Geller, Esq. (Aug. 7, 1993).
2. Id.
3. As with my friend before me, I do not mean to seriously suggest that the United States Supreme Court is
deciding what cases to hear based on the future short citation form of that case. I simply mean to convey that I am
a bit puzzled by the Court's grant of certiorari in this case.
4. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2145 (1993). Four Lamb's
Chapeldecisions will be cited in this Article. The two district court opinions will be referred to as Lamb's Chapel
Iand Lamb Chapel1f and are reported at 736 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) and 770 F.Supp. 91 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), respectively. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision is reported at 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992).
5. The Supreme Court breaks down cases according to whether the petitioners have retained paid counsel or
are in forma pauperis. For the 1991 and 1992 terms, the Court granted only 209 of the 12,561 petitions for certiorari that were submitted. UNITED STATES SUPREME Cour CLERK'S OFFICE, STATISTICAL SHEET No. 25 (October Term 1992 (June 24, 1993, corrected)). Thus, the total number of petitions fur certiorari granted equalled
less than 2 % of those submitted.
6. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
7. See infm notes 13-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's "public forum doctrine."
8. See infra notes 13-43 and accompanying text.
9. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at 2141.
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review the background of the Lamb's Chapellitigation1" and will continue with an
examination of the court opinions from the district court through the Supreme
Court.11 Finally, this Article will attempt to discern the importance of the Lamb's
Chapel decision and will endeavor to predict the impact this decision may have on
12
like cases in the future.
I. PUBLIC FoRA AND THE SUPREME COURT

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law.

. .

abridging the freedom of speech .

This right to free speech, while a preferred and protected liberty,

4

",13

is not

10. See infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the district court opinions. See infra notes
81-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Second Circuit's decision. See infra notes 90-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court opinions.
12. See infra notes 108-48 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The full text of the First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." Id.
The First Amendment's protections and guarantees of personal freedom against intrusion by the United States
Government are among those liberties secured by the Fourteenth Amendment against state intrusion or abridgment. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (citations omitted).
14. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Olur decisions properly emphasize that any significant restriction of First Amendment freedoms carries a heavy burden of justification.");
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ("Freedom of press, freedom of speech, [and] freedom of
religion are in a preferred position."). See generally International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
112 S. Ct. 2701, 2716-17 (1992) ("At the heart of our jurisprudence lies the principle that in a free nation citizens must have the right to gather and speak with other persons in public places."); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254,270 (1964) (noting "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials"); Robert B. McKay, The Preferencefor Freedom,
34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182, 1184 n.7 (1959) (wherein Professor McKay notes that this notion of First Amendment
rights holding a preferred position stems from Justice Stone's footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), stating that "[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.").
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absolute.'" It must be balanced, at times, against countervailing interests that seek
or demand to limit that freedom.1" When these rights and interests conflict, the
courts are called upon to determine when the First Amendment right to free
speech must yield. 17
One such conflict which the Supreme Court has wrestled with for some time
now is the difficult question 8 of how best to resolve the inevitable clash between
the constitutional guarantees of free speech, free expression, free assembly, and
the government's interest in maintaining the integrity of property within its control. ' One method has taken hold as the predominant test for resolving this conflict; aptly named, it is the Supreme Court's "public forum doctrine." First
described in detail in the case of Perry EducationAss'n v. Perry Local Educators'

15. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) ("First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been
thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases, or to use any
form of address in any circumstances that he chooses."). See also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985) ("Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all
times."); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) ("First
Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any manner
that may be desired.").
The classic formulation of this limitation was Justice Holmes' statement in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919):
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic. . . .The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
Id.
This, however, is only one of the situations in which the freedom of speech or expression may be limited. Another situation, quite obviously, and the subject of this article, is the Government's right to limit expression on
publicly owned property. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800 ("Nothing in the Constitution requires the
Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of
Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the
speaker's activities."); Greer, 424 U.S. at 836 (Government, " 'no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.'" (quoting Adderley
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)).
16. Jennifer A. Giamo & Stacy P. Maza, Comment, International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee: Public Forum Analysis of Airport Restrictions on Speech, 6 ST. JOHNS J. LEGAL COMMENT. 333, 334 n.5
(1991) ("The United States Supreme Court has not espoused an absolutist view of the first amendment, but has
engaged in a balancing of interests to determine whether there has been an infringement upon free speech.") (citations omitted).
17. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 816 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("At the same time, however, expressive activity on government property may interfere with other important activities for which the property is used. Accordingly, in answering the question whether a person has a right to engage in expressive activity on government
property, the Court has recognized that the person's right to speak and the interests that such speech serves for
society as a whole must be balanced against the 'other interests inhering in the uses to which the public property is
normally put.' ") (quoting Adderley, 385 U.S. at 54 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
18. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 815 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The public forum doctrine arose out of the
Court's efforts to address the recurring and troublesome issue of when the First Amendment gives an individual
or group the right to engage in expressive activity on government property.").
19. For example, and particularly relevant for our purposes here, the Court's statement in Cornelius that it
"has adopted a forum analysis as a means of determining when the Government's interest in limiting the use of its
property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property forother purposes.
Accordingly, the extent to which the Government can control access depends on the nature of the relevant forum."
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. This formulation of the public forum doctrine has been quoted often by the Court.
See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990).
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Ass'n2" in 1983, this analytical tool classifies government owned property according to what type of expressive activity, if any, has been permitted there and establishes a corresponding standard that measures the constitutionality of a
government regulation restricting free expression. 1
Commentators and litigants alike have expressed a growing concern that the
"public forum" approach is not the liberating force it was initially thought to be.
Rather, they believe it has become a muzzle, choking and muting speech that it
was designed to protect.22
Although there has certainly been some confusion regarding the use of this doctrine, the Supreme Court has consistently utilized this approach in resolving the
conflicts between free speech and government control of its property.23 One such
case in which it did so was Lamb's Chapel.24 Thus, my analysis of the Lamb
Chapel decision must begin with an examination of the "public forum doctrine."
For purposes of adjudging what speech is permissible on government property,
the Supreme Court has traditionally divided government property into three

20. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). See generally Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726 (Justice O'Connor states in a plurality opinion that in Perry, "the Court announced a tripartite framework for determining how First Amendment interests
are to be analyzed with respect to Government property.").
21. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. The first significant use of some of the terms that today comprise the "public
forum doctrine" appeared in the case of Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939),
wherein the Court stated the oft-quoted dicta that has become a cornerstone of the public forum doctrine:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of
the public and, . . . have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a
part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
Id. at 515. Since the Hague case, the term public forum has appeared numerous times in Supreme Court decisions beginning with International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 796 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting), and again in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 617 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). However, it was not
until the Perrycase in 1983 that the doctrine took hold as the preferred analytical tool for resolving questions of
what speech is permissible on government owned property. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37 (1983).
See generally Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The MisleadingNature of PublicForumAnalysis: Content and
Context in FirstAmendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219 (1984) [hereinafter Farber & Nowak]; Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the PublicForum: Cox v. Louisana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1965) (wherein Professor
Kalven presents the first in-depth review of the public forum concept after the Supreme Court's decision in Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)).
22. See, e.g., Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 741 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I have questioned whether public forum
analysis, as the Courthas employed it in recent cases, serves to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues at hand.");
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, New York Civil Liberties Union, People for the American Way, and Union of American Hebrew
Congregations, in Support of Petitioners at 18-19, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (No. 91-2024) (The ACLU argues that because "the conceptual framework of Perry suffers from a central inconsistency," the public forum doctrine should be abandoned in favor of a reasonableness
test.); Farber & Nowak, supra note 21, at 1224 ("Our objection to public forum analysis is not that it invariably
yields wrong results (although it sometimes does), but that it distracts attention from the first amendment values
at stake in a given case."); Michael A. Scherago, Note, Closing The Dooron the PublicForum, 26 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 241,263 (1992) [hereinafter Scheragol ("The public forum doctrine should be abandoned in its entirety.").
23. The Court has addressed this question three times in the past three years and has utilized the public forum
doctrine in each of those cases. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2141 (1993); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992); Kokinda, 497
U.S. 720 (1990). See also infra notes 25-43 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the use of the "public forum doctrine."
24. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
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classifications: the traditional public forum, the designated public forum, and the
nonpublic forum.2"
Traditional public fora are those "places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate .... "26 In these traditional
public fora, such as streets and parks, the government's ability to regulate speech is
most restricted, with the standard being one of strict scrutiny.27 This standard requires the government to prove that there is a compelling state interest underlying
an exclusionary regulation and that the regulation is narrowly drawn to further
that interest.28 If the government fails to meet this arduous standard, the regulation
must fall, and the excluded party must be granted access.29
The second classification of public property, similar in nature to the traditional
public forum, is the designated public forum which can be of either a limited or
unlimited nature.3" Property in this second classification is that "property that the

25. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983) (The Court noted that
"[t]he existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right
must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue," and then condensed and reviewed
the tripartite system of classifying government property that had developed over the years.). See generallyFarber
& Nowak, supra note 21, at 1220-21 (discussing the "three kinds of forums in which communication takes
place").
26. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) ("[W]e have repeatedly
referred to public streets as the archetype of a traditional public forum."); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org.,
307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public."); Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that "the
[bus] [tierminal building is an appropriate place for expressing one's views precisely because the primary activity
for which it is designed is attended with noisy crowds and vehicles, some unrest and less than perfect order. Like a
covered marketplace area, the congestion justifies rules regulating other forms of activity, but it seems undeniable that the place should be available for use in appropriate ways as a public forum."), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1968) (footnote omitted).
27. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16.
28. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381,385 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993). In these traditional public fora the government is also permitted to enforce time, place, and manner restrictions provided they
are "content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
29. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, the Supreme Court found that the
University of Missouri at Kansas City had created a designated open forum by granting access to their facilities to
over one hundred officially recognized student organizations. Id. at 274. As such, the Court applied the strict
scrutiny test, as it would have to any regulation restricting speech in a traditional public forum, to a university
regulation excluding a student Bible club. Id. at 277. Due to the University's inability to demonstrate a compelling
state interest in excluding the Bible Club, the Court held that the regulation was unconstitutional and the club
must be granted access to the school facilities on the same grounds as all other student organizations. Id.
30. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. See also International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2701,2705 (1992) ("The second category of public property is the designated public forum, whether of a limited
or unlimited character.").
There has been a considerable amount of confusion regarding this second classification due to certain commentators labeling these types of fora "limited public fora." See, e.g., Brett W. Berg, Note, Diminishingthe Freedom
to Speak on Public Property: International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 26 CREIGHTON L.
Rav. 1265, 1281 (1993) ("Places which have been opened intentionally for the purpose of facilitating public
speaking and expression were labeled as limited public forums." (footnote omitted)).
This article argues that regardless of the label one uses, the standard to be applied to an exclusionary regulation
differs depending on the nature of the speaker and/or the subject the speaker seeks to discuss. See infra notes 10848 and accompanying text.
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state has opened for expressive'activity by part or all of the public."31 Traditionally, property falling within this second classification was subject to the same
strict scrutiny applicable to public fora: once the property is opened for expressive
activity, a government regulation restricting speech on that type of property must
be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. 2 This still holds true for
the category of unlimited designated public forum which includes government
property which has been opened for indiscriminate expressive activity by the public. 3 Finally, it is important to note that the government is under no obligation to
open a forum to any expressive activity nor is it required to "indefinitely retain the
open character of the facility."34
However, it seems that there might now be a split in the designated public forum category according to whether the government has opened its property to all
or some of the public.3 The "limited public forum" is a subcategory of the designated public forum, a classification that permits the property in question to remain
nonpublic "except as to specified uses."3" Thus, if the government has permitted a
certain subject to be discussed on its property or has granted access to a select class
of speakers, then the exclusion of any future use similar to those previously permitted must be judged by the stringent compelling interest standard.37 Conversely,
the prohibition of speech or the exclusion of speakers dissimilar to those

31. Lee, 112 S.Ct. at 2705. See also Cornelius v. NAACP Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985) ("In addition to traditional public fora, a public forum may be created by government designation of a
place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain
speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects.").
The Supreme Court has determined that government facilities, such as public universities, Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981); public school board meetings, City of Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); and municipal theaters, Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), are designated public fora.
However, the Court has also stated that "[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or by
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum fbr public discourse."
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
32. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 ("The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum
generally open to the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. Although a State is
not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same
standards as apply in a traditional public forum." (citations omitted)). See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying
text fbr a discussion of the strict scrutiny standard.
33. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
34. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. See also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
35. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction between property opened
for indiscriminate use by the public and property opened for use by selected speakers or for discussion of selected
subjects.
36. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1992), revd, 113 S.
Ct. 2141 (1993).
37. Id.
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traditionally granted access is reviewed under the standard governing the third and
most restrictive category, the nonpublic forum.38
This third category of fora consists of "[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication."39 In these nonpublic fora,
the government need only demonstrate that its regulation restricting speech is reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. 40
Theoretically, all government owned property falls within the three classifications reviewed above, and any regulation restricting speech is judged by one of the
two aforementioned standards.4 1 Yet reasonable minds will differ on even the most
basic question: In which category does a particular piece of state property belong,

38. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990). Regardless of the nomenclature one uses, the distinction here lies in whether the person applying for use of a certain forum is a member of the class of speakers for
whom the forum has been opened or if the person wishes to discuss a topic that has previously been aired in that
forum. The Second Circuit, as it had previously in Lamb's Chapel, discussed this distinction:
Places opened specifically for the use of certain speakers or for the discussion of certain subjects are referred to as "limited" or "designated" fora. As to these fora, "the first amendment protections provided to
traditional public forums [sic] only apply to entities of a character similar to those the government admits
to the forum."
Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 386 (citations omitted) (quoting Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 82 (2d
Cir. 1986)). See also, Longo v. United States Postal Serv., 953 F.2d 790 (2d Cir.), cert. granted and judgment
vacated, 113 S. Ct. 31 (1992); Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991).
The plaintiffs in Lamb's Chapel argued that this limited public forum distinction that the Second Circuit used to
uphold Center Moriches' regulation excluding the church from school district property was an unconstitutional
distortion of the Supreme Court's public forum doctrine. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,2146 (1993). However, the Supreme Court itself has stated on numerous occasions that
different standards could be applied to speakers seeking access to the same public facilities. In United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990), the Court stated:
We have held that "[tihe government does not create a public forum by . . . . pennitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse." Even conceding
that the forum here has been dedicated to some First Amendment uses, and thus is not a purely nonpublic forum, under Perry, regulation of the reserved non-public uses would still require application of
the reasonableness test.
Id. at 730 (other citations omitted) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 802 (1985)). In fact, the Court alluded to this distinction as far back as Perry by stating that "selective access
does not transform government property into a public forum." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983).
39. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. Very often, government faciities falling within this category are those properties
"[w]here the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license." International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S.
Ct. 2701, 2705 (1992). The Court has further held on numerous occasions that" '" '[the State, no less than a
private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
"
dedicated.' " ' Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns,
453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981) (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (quoting Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)))).
40. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. In this regard, the Court has noted time and again that
the "First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by
the government." In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the State may reserve the forum for
its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and
not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 129) (citations omitted). See also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
808 (The Court notes that "[tihe Government's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.").
41. See generally Scherago, supra note 22, at 243 ("By 1983, public forum analysis identified three categories
into which all public property could be placed: the traditional public forum, the designated public forum, and the
nonpublic frum." (citations omitted)).
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and, thus, by which corresponding standard is it to be judged?42 The difficulty in
answering this question has resulted in an explosion of public forum litigation and
commentary in the nine years since Perry.' The only constant through the years
has been disagreement over whether this approach helps or hinders the proper resolution of these conflicts. An examination of the Lamb's Chapel case will demonstrate the difficulty courts have had in categorizing government property and
determining the proper standard to apply.
II. Lamb's Chapel LITIGATION
A. Statement ofFacts
Section 414 of the New York Education Law vests control and supervision of
public school property in the trustees or board of education of the district in which
the property is located." Section 414 enumerates the proper uses of public school
property and permits the trustees or board of education to promulgate regulations,

42. This disagreement is best illustrated by the numerous dissenting opinions in Supreme Court cases addressing the question of what type of public forum is at issue. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720
(1990) (A majority of Justices found the sidewalk adjacent to a United States Post Office to be a nonpublic forum
while Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, in dissent, argued that a public sidewalk was indeed a public forum, regardless of its proximity to a United States postal facility. Id. at 722-37 (majority); Id. at 740-63 (dissenting)); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (A plurality of Justices ruled that advertising
space on city owned vehicles was a nonpublic forum, while the dissenting tandem of Justices Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, and Powell believed that the government had created a designated public forum "[b]y accepting commercial and public service advertisements." Id. at 319; Id. at 299-308 (plurality); Id. at 308-22 (dissent)). See
also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976).
43. In the first in-depth analysis of the "public forum doctrine" following the Supreme Court's decision in
Perry, Professors Farber and Nowak noted that in the fifty-nine years between 1925 and 1984 the "phrase 'public
forum' has appeared in only thirty-two Supreme Court decisions." Farber & Nowak, supranote 21, at 1221. The
authors based that assertion on LEXIS and WESTLAW searches of Supreme Court opinions since 1925. Id. at
1221 n. 15. In a similar search conducted during the writing of this article and limited to the nine years since the
Perry decision, a total of twenty-eight Supreme Court cases use the phrase "public forum." While that may not
seem at first glance to constitute "an explosion of public forum litigation," a similar search of federal court cases
yielded an additional 636 decisions mentioning the public forum. Thus, while the Supreme Court has continuously attempted to clarify the public forum analytical procedure, the lower federal courts have been inundated
with cases seeking a declaration of what government restriction of speech is permissible.
A second indication of the controversy surrounding the public forum doctrine is the vast amount of legal commentary that has been written in the nine years since Perry. A search of the Index To Legal Periodicalsrevealed
that a separate heading has recently been created for the "Public forum doctrine," inasmuch as the subject was
becoming too extensive for the "Freedom of speech" heading. A total oftwenty-five articles have been written on
the topic in just the past two years. See INDEX To LEGAL PERIODICALS, SUBJEcT AND AUTHOR INDEX 202, (Stephen
Rosen ed., Oct. 1992-Aug. 1993); INDEX To LEGAL PERIODICALS, SUBJECT AND AUTHOR INDEX 618, (Stephen
Rosen ed., Oct. 1991 -Sept. 1992).
44. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414(1) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993) ("Schoolhouses and the grounds connected
therewith and all property belonging to the district shall be in the custody and under the control and supervision
of the trustees or board of education of the district.").
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consistent with that section, to govern the use of property within its control.4" The
ten purposes set forth in this section have been held by both state and federal courts
to encompass the entire realm of permissible uses of school property.4" Conspicuously absent from these47 ten enumerated uses is the use of public school property
for religious purposes.
Pursuant to the enabling provision of section 414 of the New York Education
Law,' the Center Moriches Union Free School District promulgated a set of regulations governing the use of property within its possession and control . 4' The
Center Moriches "Rules & Regulations for Community Use of School Property"
[hereinafter "Rules & Regulations"] permits use of its property for social, civic,
and recreational purposes provided that such use is "non-exclusive and open to all
residents of the school district."" The Rules & Regulations further provide that
"[t]he school premises shall not be used by any group for religious purposes. " 5'
Consistent with the State Education Law and the local Rules & Regulations,
Center Moriches opened the doors to its public school property and permitted a
45. Id. New York Education Law provides that the trustees or board of education may permit school district
property to be used, when the property is not being used for school purposes, for these ten distinct purposes:
1. "education, learning or the arts,"
2. "public library purposes,"
3. "for holding social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining
to the welfare of the community; but such meetings, entertainment and uses shall be non-exclusive and
shall be open to the general public,"
4. "for meetings and entertainment where admission is charged and the proceeds applied to an educational or charitable purpose, but not for the benefit of a religious sect or denomination,"
5. "for polling places for primaries and elections or for political meetings and registration of voters,"
6. "civic forums and community centers,"
7. "for classes of instruction for mentally retarded minors,"
8. "fbr recreation, physical training and athletics,"
9. "fbr child care services during non-school hours," and
10. "for graduation exercises held by not-for-profit elementary and secondary schools, provided that no
religious service is performed."
Id. § 414(1 )(a)-(j). Section 414 further provides that:
The trustees or board of education may adopt reasonable regulations for the use of such schoolhouses,
grounds or other property, all portions thereof, when not in use for school purposes or when the school is
in use for school purposes if in the opinion of the trustees or board of education use will not be disruptive
of normal school operations, for such other public purposes as are herein provided.
Id. § 414(1).
46. See Trietley v. Board of Educ., 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) ("Religious purposes are
not included in the enumerated purposes for which a school may be used under section 414 of the Education Law
....
Consequently, the board of education had no authority to grant petitioners' request to form Bible clubs in
the public high schools."); see also Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 948 F.2d 79 (2d
Cir. 1991) (holding that the Trietley court's interpretation of section 414 as enumerating all permissible uses for
public school property is an interpretation binding on the federal courts).
47. N.Y. EIuc. LAW § 414(l)(a)-(j) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993); see supra text accompanying notes 4546.
48. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 414(1) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993).
49. Joint Appendix at 74-77, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141
(1993) (No. 91-2024) [hereinafter Joint Appendix]. The Rules & Regulations provide specific instructions to
potential applicants relating to the type, time, and manner of outside organizational use of Center Moriches'
property. Id.
50. Id. at 75, rule 10. Use of school district property for social, civic, and recreational activities is explicitly
authorized by New York Education Law § 414(l)(c), provided that such use "shall be non-exclusive and shall be
open to the general public." N.Y. EIuc. LAW § 414(l)(c).
51. Joint Appendix at 75, Lamb Chapel (No. 91-2024).
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wide range of outside entities to use the facilities. 2 However, Center Moriches had
never been presented with an application by any entity requesting permission to
use the facilities for religious purposes," and no organization had ever used the
Center Moriches facilities for the purpose of religious proselytization. I
Against this background of state and local regulation concerning community
use of public school property came Lamb's Chapel, an evangelical Christian
church with an established congregation in Center Moriches."5 Reverend John D.
Steigerwald, the pastor of Lamb's Chapel," led the congregation toward their ultimate objective, "to share the love of Christ in very real and practical ways." 7 This
mission apparently led Reverend Steigerwald, in November, 1988, to the Center
Moriches Union Free School District in search of facilities large enough to accommodate his growing parish."
Initially, Reverend Steigerwald petitioned Alice Schoener" of the Center
Moriches School District for permission to use the Center Moriches High School

52. Pursuant to rule ten of the Rules & Regulations, Center Moriches has permitted many organizations to use
the school district's facilities for social, civic, and recreational purposes. Id. at 75. A sampling of these diverse
groups include the following: Hampton Council of Churches/Family Counseling Services; Salvation Army;
Southern Harmonizers Gospel Singing; Unkechaug Dance Group; Moriches Bay Civic Association, Inc.; Center
Moriches Free Public Library; S.C. Girl Scouts; Boy Scouts of America Troop 414; Myo-Mastic Sports Club;
The Manorville Humane Society; Family Counseling Service; Moriches Youth Organization. Id. at 93, 95-99,
110, 111, 114, 126, 132, & 135.
53. Ms. Schoener wrote to Reverend Steigerwald upon receiving his request for use of the school district facilities for the purpose of showing a film series, stating:
As indicated in my earlier letter to you, we are bound by education law concerning the use of school facilities by religious organizations. Fortunately, we have not, to date, been put to the test of determining when
a use of the facility by one of our local churches would constitute "religious purposes." I am hard pressed
to determine from your description, what the five-part movie would represent, but suspect that it would
certainly have religious connotations.
Id. at81.
54. While no group has ever listed a religious purpose as its objective in applying for use of the Center
Moriches facilities, Lamb's Chapel argued to the district and circuit court that a number of the previous uses were
religious in nature. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 387-88 (2d Cir.
1992), rev d, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). As examples, the petitioners pointed to the following: The Salvation Army
Band Benefit Concert in which there was an invocation and the singing and playing of religious songs, Id. at 387;
the Gospel Music Concert in which the Southern Harmonizers Gospel Singing Group sang "Amazing Grace" as
well as other gospel songs, Id. at 388; the New Age Religion Lecture Series in which parapsychologist Jerry Huck
gave a lecture entitled "Psychology and the Unknown," Id. Mr. Huck acknowledged that although his lecture contained references to a Far Eastern concept known as Kundalini, that such references were simply "'a fascinating
sideline' and 'not the purpose of the [lecture].'" Id.
55. Joint Appendix at 70-72, Lamb' Chapel (No. 91-2024). See also Long Island Church at Center of Not
What But W'ho, N.Y. TiMES, June 8, 1993, at A23 ("Lamb's Chapel is a nondenominational, evangelical church
with about 150 members from this eastern Long Island hamlet and surrounding areas.").
56. Joint Appendix at 4, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024). At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in June,
1993, the pastor at Lamb's Chapel was Reverend Allen T. Sharp. Estelle Lauder, PastorApplauds the Court
Ruling, NEwsDAY (New York), June 8, 1993, at 1,5, & 104.
57. Joint Appendix at 70, Lamb s Chapel (No. 91-2024).
58. Id. at 70-72. Reverend Steigerwald stated in his initial letter to Ms. Schoener and the Center Moriches
School District that Lamb's Chapel "has experienced such growth that it creates a problem for me and the families
of our congregation. The V.F.W. Hall which is headed by Bernard A. Volin (who has been more than courteous
[sic] and accommodating) is no longer adequate for our Sunday services."
59. Id. at 73-78. Ms. Schoener was the "business manager and district clerk" for Center Moriches School
District and was responsible for reviewing applications for use of Center Moriches facilities. Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. (Lamb's Chapel I), 770 F Supp 91, 92-93 (E. D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 959
F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) [hereinafter Lambs Chapel ll].
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facilities to conduct Sunday morning services and hold Sunday school. 6" Ms.
Schoener denied Reverend Steigerwald's request, citing the religious use prohibition of rule seven of the Rules & Regulations as well as New York Education Law
section 414.1 Reverend Steigerwald changed his request, asking simply for use of
the Center Moriches facilities one night per week for five consecutive weeks.62
The purpose of Lamb's Chapel in requesting access was to show a film series on
family values and child rearing entitled Turn Your Heart Toward Home.63 Reverend
Steigerwald admitted that this film series, designed to "encourage and educate parents in raising positive families," was from a Christian perspective.6 4 Ms.
Schoener once again denied Reverend Steigerwald's request for use of public
school facilities, basing the decision on the decidedly religious nature of the film
series.6
These denials prompted Lamb's Chapel to file suit against the Center Moriches
School District,66 alleging, inter alia, that the denial of its applications violated the
Church's and its parishioners' constitutional right of freedom of speech.
60. Joint Appendix at 73, Lamb's Chapel(No. 91-2024).
61.Id. at 78.
62. Id. at 79-80. Reverend Steigerwald first petitioned Center Moriches to use its facilities to show this film
series in December, 1988. Id. After requesting and receiving further information on the proposed film series,
Ms. Schoener denied the Lamb's Chapel request citing the religious nature of the film series. Id. at 81-84. In
October, 1989, Reverend Steigerwald submitted a second application seeking to show the same film series and
was once again denied due to the religious perspective of the film. Id. at 90-92.
63. Id. at 83. The Turn Your Heart Toward Home film series contains a series of lectures by Dr. James Dobson.
Id. at 88. Dr. Dobson is a licensed psychologist, author, and former associate clinical professor of pediatrics at the
University of Southern California. Id.
The brochure that Reverend Steigerwald sent to Ms. Schoener contained the following description of Dr.
Dobson's film series:
In this bold new film series, America's most trusted family life expert brings his vast experience to bear
on one of society's most pressing challenges- the protecting and strengthening of family relationships.
Citing example after familiar example, Dr. Dobson portrays the pressures today's parents are susceptible to. The time traps that steal precious moments so important to a child's welfare. The battlegrounds of
parent/child relationships.
And he reminds parents of society's slide toward humanism - the undermining influences of radio, television, films and the press-which can only be counterbalanced by a loving home where Christian values
are instilled from an early age.
"Time is the priceless gift we can give our families."
A swelling majority of Americans sense the vulnerability of their own families, and are willing to make
all commitments necessary to preserve them. Commitments to their marital relationships. Commitments
to their children and home lives. Commitments to get involved in issues that affect the family.
It is the purpose of this powerful new film series to challenge those individuals to return to the traditional values upon which families are best created and nurtured.
Id. at 86-87.
64. Id. at90.
65. Id. at 84, 92.
66. Id. Also named as a defendant in Lamb's Chapel's summons and complaint was Louise Tramontano in her
official capacity as president of the Center Moriches Board of Education. Id. at 3. The New York State Attorney
General's Office joined the suit as an intervenor pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
67. See id. at 3-15. This article is going to focus on the plaintiffs' allegation that their constitutional right to
free speech has been violated, as that was the basis upon which the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and
granted the plaintiffs application for an injunction. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). However, plaintiffs' complaint also alleged that their constitutional rights of freedom of
assembly, free exercise of their religion, and equal protection of the law were violated. Joint Appendix at 5-12,
Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024). Finally, the plaintiffs' also allege that the defendants' action constituted a violation
of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Id. at 12-13.
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B. District Court Proceedings
On February 9, 1990, Lamb's Chapel and John Steigerwald filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining the school district from prohibiting plaintiffs from
showing a film series in school district facilities. 8 The district court reviewed the
Supreme Court's tripartite classification system for publicly owned property and
examined the standards for judging what speech may constitutionally be excluded
from each different forum.69 The court found that the school district had created a
limited designated public forum rather than an unlimited designated public forum70 and that the state had "by policy and practice circumscribed availability
through reasonable and viewpoint-neutral regulations."71 The court denied the
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, 72 and the plaintiffs appealed.7 3
"[T]hat appeal was withdrawn at the suggestion of the Staff Counsel for the
Second Circuit, and the case [was] . . .returned to" the district court for a final
disposition.74 Although the relief requested on this return to the district court differed from the first case, the result was the same. 75 Defendants' cross-motion for
summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed.76
The court held, as it had on plaintiffs initial application, that because Center
Moriches had not permitted "organizations of similar character to Lamb's Chapel
to use its facilities for religious purposes, 77 the school district property was

68. Joint Appendix at 13, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024). The Lambs Chapel complaint further sought an injunction compelling the school district to permit religious or political groups to use district facilities "without
discriminat[ing] against them because of the religious context or political content of their speech."Id. Finally, the
plaintiffs' complaint requested declaratory relief, seeking a statement that the defendants had created an open forum in the school district's facilities and that the school district's denial of plaintiffs' application was a violation of
a number of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Id. at 13-14.
69. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. (Lamb's Chapel I), 736 F Supp. 1247, 1250-51
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) [hereinafter Lamb Chapel I].
70. Id. at 1252. See supra notes 13-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's "public
forum doctrine."
71. Id. at 1254.
72. Id.
73. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. (Lamb's Chapel II),
770 E Supp. 91 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), af'd, 959 F2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993).
74. Lamb's ChapelI, 770 F Supp. at 92. Staff Counsel for the Second Circuit suggested returning the case to
the district court to allow that court to consider the plaintiffs allegations in light of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). Lamb's ChapelH, 770 F Supp. at 92.
The court adhered to its prior ruling that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief requested in their complaint,
finding that Mergens was decided on purely statutory grounds that were inapplicable to the Lamb's Chapelcase.
Lamb's ChapelI1, 770 F. Supp. at 97.
In Mergens, the Supreme Court determined that the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988), prohibited a high school "from denying a student religious group permission to meet on school premises during noninstructional time." Mergens, 496 U.S. at 231. In addition, the Court determined that granting student religious
groups equal access to school facilities does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at
253.
75. Instead of seeking injunctive and declaratory relief as they had initially in Lamb's Chapel I, the plaintiffs
moved for summary judgment. Lamb's ChapelH, 770 F Supp. at 92. Center Moriches also moved for
summary
judgment. Id.
76.Id. at99.
77. Id.

1993]

TOLLING THE FINAL BELL

properly characterized as "limited public fora."78 Once again, the district court examined the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to permissible speech in
public and nonpublic fora and determined that in a limited public forum the state
regulation need only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral to pass constitutional
muster."9 Finally, the court held that "[b]ecause the School District ha[d] not, by
policy or practice, opened its doors to groups akin to Lamb's Chapel, . . . the
School District's denial of plaintiffs' applications to show the film series is viewpoint-neutral and, hence, constitutional."8
C. Second Circuit Opinion
On March 18, 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision granting summary judgment to Center
Moriches.81 The court of appeals examined relevant Supreme Court precedent
with respect to "the extent of permissible governmental regulation of expressive
activity on publicly owned property"82 and recognized that such regulation is
largely "dependent upon the character [and primary purpose] of the [government]
property in question."83 The court identified the three classifications traditionally
used by the Supreme Court as part of its "forum analysis"' approach to questions
of free speech and determined that the property at issue in Lamb's Chapel actually
fell within the subcategory of" 'limited public forum,' [a] . . . classification that
allows it to remain nonpublic except as to specified uses.""
In such a limited public forum, a regulation restricting speech is constitutional
if it can be shown to be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.8 The Second Circuit
determined that Center Moriches' rule seven was indeed reasonable and
viewpoint-neutral, stating that they "have not been able to identify any prior use of
Center Moriches' School District facilities for purposes that are religious in any
meaningful way."87 Lacking such prior religious use, the court found that it was
viewpoint-neutral to exclude speech on the basis of its religious content.88 As
such, the court ruled that there was no constitutional violation and affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment to the Center Moriches School
District.89

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1992), revd, 113 S.
Ct. 2141 (1993).
82. Id. at 385.
83. Id.
84. See supra notes 13-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's "public forum doctrine."
85. Lamb Chapel, 959 F.2d at 386.
86. Id. at 388. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
87. Lamb' Chapel, 959 F.2d at 388.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 389.
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D. Supreme Court Opinions
After the district court's decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit, plaintiffs
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United
States.9" The Court granted plaintiffs' petition, stating that it did so " [b]ecause the
holding below was questionable under our decisions .... "91
In an opinion joined by four of the Justices and the Chief Justice, Justice White
began by examining New York education law and Center Moriches' regulations regarding community use of public school property. 2 The Court accepted as controlling, as the Second Circuit had,93 a New York appellate court's interpretation
of section 414 of the New York Education Law, which held that public school
property may only be used for the ten purposes explicitly enumerated in the statute.

The Court then addressed the plaintiffs' arguments with respect to the appropriate categorization of Center Moriches' facilities and the proper corresponding
standard to be applied." The Court accepted the district and circuit courts' determination that the district facilities were limited public fora and that the regulation
prohibiting Lamb's Chapel from using Center Moriches School District property
was constitutional if it could be proven to be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.
However, the Court disagreed with both lower courts on another critical question and held that rule seven of the Center Moriches Rules & Regulations was indeed viewpoint-discriminatory and, thus, unconstitutional. 97 Justice White
reasoned that the film series Lamb's Chapel sought to show dealt primarily with
the issue of child rearing and family values. 98 This subject, according to the Court,
was one on which any other group would have been permitted to speak.9 9 Thus,
Center Moriches' denial of Lamb's Chapel's petition was based solely on the

90. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 51 (1992).
91. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2145 (1993).
92. Id. at 2143-44. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter joined in
Justice White's opinion. Id. at 2143. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. Id. at 2149. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. Justice Thomas joined the
concurring opinion of Justice Scalia. Id.
93. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 387 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
94. Id. at 386-87. See Trietley v. Board of Educ., 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) ("Religious
purposes are not included in the enumerated purposes for which a school may be used under section 414.") (citations omitted). The Trietley case was cited with approval by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Deeper Life
Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Board of Education, 852 F.2d 676,680 (2d Cir. 1988) ("By state law, public school
buildings may be used by the general public only for . . . purposes enumerated in New York Education Law
§ 414. The provision of religious worship, instruction, and fundraising is not among these purposes.").
95. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2146-48.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2147.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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viewpoint it wished to express on an otherwise permissible subject.1"' Justice
White concluded that this is precisely what the First Amendment prohibits.101
On this "speech" question, the concurring opinions of Justices Kennedy and
Scalia both state very simply that they agree that the school district's02actions violated the plaintiffs' constitutionally guaranteed right to free speech.'
The school district further argued to the Supreme Court that the Establishment
Clause barred the use of school property for religious purposes. 103 With respect to
this argument based on the constitutional separation of church and state mandate,
the Court stated:
The district property had repeatedly been used by a wide variety of private organizations. Under these circumstances, as in Widmar, there would have been no realistic
danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or
any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the Church would have been
no more than incidental.

104

Thus, the Court held that the three prong test articulated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, used to determine when a government regulation contravenes the
Establishment Clause, was not violated.1" 6 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion,
and to a lesser extent Justice Kennedy's concurrence, derided the Court for

100. Id. at 2147-48.
101. Id. at 2148. Justice White's majority opinion summarily rejected a number of other arguments raised on
behalf of respondents. First, the school district had argued that public policy required denial of Lamb's Chapel's
application. Brief for Respondents at 4-5, 11-13, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113
S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (No. 91-2024). Initially, the district asserted that a court-ordered open access policy might
force school districts to close their property "rather than become embroiled in controversy every time a radical
religious . . . organization [sought] access to [school] facilities." Id. Secondly, granting access to radical religious organizations may result in the destruction of school property or the interruption and disruption of the
proper functioning of the school. Id. at 12-13.
Justice White responded to the destruction of school property argument by stating that: "There is nothing in the
record to support such a justification, which in any event would be difficult to defend as a reason to deny the
presentation of a religious point of view about a subject the district otherwise makes open to discussion on district
property." Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148. The majority decision did not respond to the respondent's argument that a court-ordered open access policy may result in the closing of school district facilities throughout the
nation if remaining open will continuously involve the school districts in litigation.
102. Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, noted the "apparent unanimity of our
conclusion that this overt, viewpoint-based discrimination contradicts the Speech Clause of the First
Amendment."Lambs Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment and stated: "I join the Court's conclusion
that the District's refusal to allow use of school facilities for petitioners' film viewing, while generally opening the
schools for community activities, violates petitioners' First Amendment free-speech rights (as does N.Y. Educ.
Law § 414 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993), to the extent it compelled the District's denial)." Id. (citations omitted).
103. Respondents' Brief at 27-30, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024).
104. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148. The Court continued by stating that:
[Plermitting District property to be used to exhibit the film involved in this case would not have been an
establishment of religion under the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971): The challenged governmental action has a secular purpose, does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Id.
105. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
106. Lambs Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at 2148.
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unnecessarily invoking the Lemon test, a test they believed to be insufficient and
outdated as a standard for a rule of law."0 7
III. DiscussioN
A. Importance
As with any attempt to discover the importance of a Supreme Court decision, a
primary focus must be placed on how the case will affect a particular area of the
law. The Lamb's Chapel decision will obviously have an impact on First
Amendment jurisprudence as both the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of
that amendment are implicated here.10 8 This discussion will focus on the Free
Speech Clause, as that was the basis upon which the Supreme Court struck down
the district's regulations.1 09
In the Lamb's Chapel case, the plaintiffs argued that the "limited public forum"
distinction that the Second Circuit used to support its decision in the school district's favor, is a distortion of the Supreme Court's "public forum" analysis."' The
Church argued that the terms "designated public forum" and "limited public forum" are synonymous;1 11 while the school district argued, according to Second
Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, that these terms distinguished two types of
fora.112 Regardless of the labels used, both parties agreed upon the proper standard
to be applied:113 that standard being dependant upon whether the speaker did or
did not meet the limiting criteria of the particular forum.' 14

107. Id. at 2149-51. Justice Kennedy found the Court's use of the Lemon test and the phrase "endorsing religion" to be unsettling and unnecessary. Id. at 2149. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined, was much
more animated in his criticism of the Court's invocation of the Lemon test. In a witty and metaphorically ripe
opinion, Justice Scalia invites comparison between the Lemon test and the seemingly immortal zombies of latenight cinema. Id. at 2149-51. In the end, his concurrence with respect to the asserted Establishment Clause violation states simply "that giving Lamb's Chapel nondiscriminatory access to school facilities cannot violate that
provision because it does not signify state or local embrace of a particular religious sect." Id. at 2151.
108. See supra note 13 for the text of the First Amendment's Free Speech and Establishment Clauses.
109. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). Despite the fact that the court of appeals focused its entire discussion and based its decision on the Supreme Court's freedom of speech public forum doctrine, the Court stated:
The appellants argue that denial of access somehow violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment as well as the Freedom of Speech Clause. It is difficult to see how this is so. If anything, a
claim of a violation of the Free Exercise Clause would be expected. Nevertheless, there is no basis for any
claim of First Amendment violation here.
Id. at 389.
110. Petitioners' Brief at 22, Lamb Chapel (No. 91-2024) ("The Second Circuit's approval of a'religion-free'
designated public forum represents an unconstitutional distortion of public forum doctrine.").
111. Id. at 26 ("As noted above, there is no separate category of'limited public forum' distinct from 'designated
public forum.' The Second Circuit's innovation represents a departure from the consistent teaching of this Court
that there are only three categories of forum: the traditional public forum, the public forum by designation, and
the nonpublic forum.").
112. Id. at 10 ("A limited public forum is defined as a subcategory of designated public forum in which the
government has opened a particular property for use by a certain class of speakers or for assembly and debate on
selected subjects." (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983); Travis
v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991))).
113. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 38 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of the different standards to be applied
to different speakers seeking access to the same forum.
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In the Widmar case for example, in a forum limited to use by student groups, the
exclusion of any new student organization would be judged by the "traditional
public fora" strict scrutiny standard."' Conversely, the denial of access to an outside community organization would presumably be reviewed under the more lenient "nonpublic fora" test for reasonableness and viewpoint-neutrality.11 Thus,
although the parties and the courts could not agree on the appropriate label, they
did agree that the standard to be used differs depending on the speaker and/or the
speaker's topic and purpose.II 7
That, unfortunately, is where their agreement ended. The plaintiffs believed
that Lamb's Chapel was an eligible speaker in a designated public forum: therefore, their exclusion from the Center Moriches facilities must be tested by the
compelling state interest standard. 1 8 To the contrary, the school district argued,
and the lower courts agreed, that Lamb's Chapel was not a member of the class for
whom the facilities had previously been opened.119 Therefore, their exclusion was
judged under the lenient nonpublic fora, reasonable/viewpoint-neutral test.12 The

115. Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,269-70(1981). See supra note 29 for a discussion of the Widmar case.
116. I use the term "presumably" because the Court does not say definitively that the reasonableness/
viewpoint-neutral standard is the standard that would be applicable. The Court, however, does note:
A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal
theaters. A university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university's
authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and
facilities. We have not held, for example, that a campus must make all of its facilities equally available to
students and non-students alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings.
Id. at 268 n.5. It seems clear that an outside organization that sought access to the university facilities for expressive activity would not be considered a member of the class for whom this forum had previously been opened. As
such, the exclusion of that organization would be judged by a different standard than the exclusion of another
student group. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 48 (This is precisely the situation the Perry Court was referring to when it
stated "[w]hile the school mail facilities thus might be a forum generally open for use by the Girl Scouts, the local
boys' club, and other organizations that engage in activities of interest and educational relevance to students, they
would not as a consequence be open to an organization such as PLEA, which is concerned with the terms and
conditions of teacher employment."); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381,
386 (2d Cir. 1992) ("'[F]irst [A]mendment protections provided to traditional public forums only apply to entities of a character similar to those the government admits to the forum.'" (quoting Calash v. City of Bridgeport,
788 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1986))), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
117. Both parties suggested in their briefs to the Supreme Court that the standard to be applied differs depending on whether the excluded party is an eligible or non-eligible speaker. See Brief fbr Petitioners at 23, Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (No. 91-2024); Respondents' Brief at
16, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024).
The lower courts agreed with this premise. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.
(Lamb's Chapel II), 770 F. Supp. 91, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), affid, 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), revd, 113 S. Ct.
2141 (1993); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381,386 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). While the Supreme Court did not mention this topic specifically, the majority did accept
the Second Circuit's use of the nonpublic forum reasonable/viewpoint-neutrality test as the proper standard to be
applied in these circumstances. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,2147
(1993).
118. Petitioners' Brief at 24, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024) (arguing that the strict scrutiny standard is triggered because Lamb's Chapel is an "entity of similar character" to those previously granted access to the Center
Moriches School District facilities).
119. Respondents' Brief at 23, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024) (the School District argued that Lamb's Chapel,
as a religious entity with a religious purpose, was dissimilar in all respects to organizations that had previously
been granted access to school property). See also Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 387-88.
120. Respondents' Brief at 23, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024).
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Supreme Court somewhat reluctantly agreed that the school district facilities did
fall within the "limited public forum" subcategory and, as such, agreed that the
nonpublic fora standard was the proper test to be applied.12
Both lower courts and the school district believed that rule seven's prohibition
on religious use was viewpoint-neutral since it excluded any and all religious organizations regardless of their affiliation or denomination. 22 The Supreme Court
disagreed. Rule seven was indeed viewpoint-discriminatory, according to the high
Court, because it prohibited religious organizations from speaking on topics
which any other group would be permitted to discuss. 123 The Court took the narrow view, focusing on the topic Lamb's Chapel wished to discuss, while the school
district and the lower courts took a somewhat broader view, choosing
instead to
1 24
focus on the nature of the speaker's purpose in using the facilities.
Thus, a situation was presented wherein two lower courts decided a case based
on the Supreme Court's public forum doctrine and held a government regulation
valid under the First Amendment.1 25 The Supreme Court then heard the case and
unanimously reversed the decision of both lower courts. 26 The foregoing
pointedly demonstrates the confusion that surrounds the Supreme Court's public

121. Lambs Chapel, 113 S. Ct. 2146-47.
122. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether the school district's denial of access to plaintiffs was viewpoint-neutral and determined that, although a close question, it was indeed nondiscriminatory as all religious uses had been prohibited equally. Lambs Chapel, 959 F.2d at 387-88. Compare
with Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692-94 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the school district's denial of an application to the plaintiffs was viewpoint-discriminatory because the district had permitted its
facilities to be used in the past for religious purposes).
123. Lambs Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2143. The Court states:
"[A]lthough a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address atopic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum. . . or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose
special benefit the forum was created. . . the government violates the First Amendment when it denies
access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject."
Id. at 2147 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
124. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993); Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993); Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. (Lamb's Chapel 1I), 770 F Supp. 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), affd,
959 F2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). Focusing as the Court did on the narrow topic that
Lamb's Chapel wished to discuss presents some extremely disturbing possibilities. For instance, it seems clear
that any group must now be granted access to Center Moriches School District property to discuss family values
and child raising. This, we must assume, would include a group such as the North American Man-Boy Love
Association [hereinafter NAMBLA]. Thus, when NAMBLA seeks access to the facilities to show a film series
on the benefit to both man and boy of such a family unit and to promote such relationships as the preferred method
of child rearing, they must be granted access on the same terms as Lamb's Chapel.
Can we suggest that this organization be excluded because their views are so much more distasteful to the general population than Christianity? I believe not. Thus, Center Moriches will be faced with a choice: Permit
NAMBLA to use the facilities or close the facilities altogether. The Supreme Court was so unimpressed with this
public policy argument when raised by the School District in Lamb Chapel that it did not utter a word in response. The issue will arise again. Hopefully, in the interest of constitutionally protected free speech, the Court
will consider the ramifications of a court-ordered open access policy.
Some may argue that the Constitution protects even the speech of the NAMBLA. Absolutely! However, I submit that the Constitution does not require that they be permitted to espouse their views on public school property.
This demonstrates, I believe, the basic failing of the Lamb's Chapel decision.
125. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381 (1992), rev'd, 113 S.Ct. 2141
(1993); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. (Lamb's Chapel 1I), 770 F. Supp. 91
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 959 F2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), revd, 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993).
126. Lambs Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2151.
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forum doctrine. It seems that the time is ripe, with the public forum doctrine already in disarray,127 for the Court to move to a new method of determining when a
government regulation restricting expression on its property contravenes the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. With the Court seemingly in transition, this movement may already be underway.128 Moving away from the rigid
tripartite classification system,129 the Court should now examine restrictions on
speech in light of the purpose and characteristics of the property13 in question
rather than simply on the traditional extracurricular use or nonuse of the property.1 31 Of course, the labels of traditional, designated, or nonpublic fora could
still be used, but the assignment of a label would not end the inquiry, nor would
the standard to be applied turn, as it does now, 132 solely on what label is used.
Actually, the classification system works rather well with respect to property
that falls within the traditional public fora category and the nonpublic fora category. However, the bulk of government owned property does not fit neatly within
these two boxes but comprises the middle classification of designated public forum "whether of a limited or unlimited character." 133 It is the breadth of this second classification that presents a problem. Courts are forced to draw a line and
make a difficult determination of whether the forum is limited or unlimited and
then apply a standard dependent on that determination.

127. See infra note 128 for a discussion of new approaches advocated by certain Justices. In addition, commentary criticizing the public forum doctrine is numerous. See, e.g., C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashingof the Public
Forum:Problems in FirstAmendment Analysis, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 109 (1986); Farber & Nowak, supra note
21; Toni M. Massaro, Equalityand Freedom of Erpression:The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv.
211 (199 1); Robert C. Post, Between Governanceand Management: The History and Theory of the PublicForum,
34 UCLA L. REv. 1713 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46 (1987).
128. After the Court's decision in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2701 (1992), a strong argument can be made that a majority of Justices are already moving away from the present
classification system. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor reiterated that a restriction on speech "'must
be assessed in light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances.' " Id. at 2712 (quoting
Cornelius v. NAACP Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). Justice Kennedy's concurrence,
which was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, suggested:
If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue and the actual public access and uses
which have been permitted by the government indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and
compatible with those uses, the property is a public forum. The most important considerations in this
analysis are whether the property shares physical similarities with more traditional public forums,
whether the government has permitted or acquiesced in broad public access to the property, and whether
expressive activity would tend to interfere in a significant way with the uses to which the government has
as a factual matter dedicated the property.
Id. at 2718 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129. See supra notes 13-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's public forum classification
system.
130. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809.
13 1. In Lee, the majority opinion did just this when it based the determination of whether airport terminals are
public fora on the history of what expressive use had been permitted there. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2706. Noting that
the "tradition of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically been made available for
speech activity," the Court ruled that airport terminals are nonpublic fora. Id.
132. See supra notes 13-43.
133. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705. See also id. at 2718 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The second category of the
Court's jurisprudence, the so-called designated forum, provides little, if any, additional protection for speech.
Where government property does not satisfy the criteria of a public forum, the government retains the power to
dedicate the property for speech, whether for all expressive activity or for limited purposes only.").
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A better system may be to combine the two standards presently in use, the com13
pelling state interest test134 and the reasonableness/viewpoint-neutrality test, 1
leaving the Court with one critical question to answer when faced with property
falling into this vast expanse between the traditional public forum and the nonpublic forum: Has the government presented an adequate justification for restricting
traditionally protected free speech on a particular piece of state property?
In essence, and very simply, the courts would be faced with a balancing test in
which the rationale for restricting speech or expression would be more difficult to
justify as the traditional openness of the forum increased. With such a standard,
the history, purpose, and characteristics of a particular forum will still be important and will either add or detract from the level ofjustification needed to support a
regulation restricting First Amendment activity. As the Court stated in the early
public fora case of Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and EducationalFund,
Inc.,136 the reasonableness of a government restriction "must be assessed in light
of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances. '37
This sentiment was echoed in a number of recent opinions by Justice O'Connor
when she stated: " ' "[C]onsideration of a forum's special attributes is relevant to
the constitutionality of a regulation since the significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved." ' ,138
B. Impact
The day following the announcement of the Court's decision in this case,
Reverend Allen Snapp of Lamb's Chapel commented that he was "grateful for the
decision that came our way this week. It means that we can speak about biblical
issues that present answers to things that are tearing the 'nation apart. 139 No one
ever doubted that he could speak about such issues; the only question was whether
he could or should do it on public school property. Apparently, Reverend Snapp

134. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the compelling interest test.
135. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasonable/viewpoint-neutral standard.
136. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
137. Id. at 809.
138. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701,2712 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990) (quoting Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,650-51 (1981))).
139. Collin Nash, PastorCalls Film Ruling GoodNews, NEWSOAY (New York), June 14, 1993, at 14.
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believes he now can. However, the Lamb's Chapel decision says no such thing.14
In fact, this decision is so fact specific that it may ultimately have little or no impact on judging what religious use is or is not permissible on government owned
property. 41 This is the basic failing of this decision. It does not provide any framework for school districts or courts to determine what religious use is permissible
on public school property.
This brings me back to my original question: Why did the Court take this case?
A case with different facts may have given the Court a better opportunity to examine this area of the law and provide the country and the lower courts with a standard by which to answer the question of when religious use of public school
facilities is proper. The Lamb's Chapel decision does not do so. For instance,
Lamb's Chapel may renew its request to Center Moriches to use the school district's property to hold Sunday sermons.142 How must Center Moriches respond to
this request following the Supreme Court's decision in Lamb's Chapel? The church
may argue that they must indeed be granted access to the facilities, yet, the opposing argument carries equal if not greater strength.
Remaining unanswered as they do, these questions will inevitably lead to further litigation. When they do, the courts would do well to recall the cautionary
words of Justice O'Connor in United States v. Kokinda:
In any event, it is anomalous that the [Postal] Service's allowance of some avenues of
speech would be relied upon as evidence that it is impermissibly suppressing other
speech. If anything, the Service's generous accommodation of some types of speech
testifies to its willingness to provide as broad a forum as possible, consistent with its
postal mission. The dissent would create, in the name of the First Amendment, a
disincentive for the Government to dedicate its property to any speech activities at

140. Apparentlyjust as Reverend Snapp believes that the Supreme Court has sanctioned religious use of public
school property, at least one court has now similarly misinterpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Lamb's
Chapel. In Shumay v. Albany County School District No. One Board of Education, 826 F. Supp. 1320, (D. Wyo.
1993), the United States District Court was presented with an action wherein the plaintiffs sought a preliminary
injunction enjoining a school district from prohibiting the plaintiffs from holding baccalaureate ceremonies on
school property. Id. at 1321.
Holding in plaintiffs' favor and granting the preliminary injunction, the court considered the recent decision in
Lamb's Chapeland stated the holding there: "The United States Supreme Court determined that a public school
district rule barring use of school facilities by groups whose subject matter has a religious purpose or a religious
viewpoint when all other groups are allowed such use violates the first amendment." Id. at 1326 (emphasis
added). That misstates the holding of Lamb's Chapel. The Supreme Court's decision in Lamb's Chapelwas very
narrow, holding simply that when any and all groups are permitted access to discuss a particular topic then any
and all religious groups must be granted access to discuss that subject. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2147 (1993). The Court did not hold, as the district court in Wyoming apparently believes, that if school district facilities are open to the public for some uses, then a religious group must be
granted access for any religious purpose.
141. Lou Grumet, Executive Director of the New York State School Boards Association, has said that he believes that school boards will still be able to keep religious groups out of the school "as long as they prevent similar
programs by secular groups." Timothy M. Phelps, Ruling Aids Churches InLI Case, Court Says School Can't Bar
Religious Group, NEWSDAY (New York), June 8, 1993, at 4.
142. Lamb's Chapel has already renewed its request to use the Center Moriches School District facilities for the
purpose of showing Dr. Dobson's film series on family values and that request has been granted. The film series
will be shown in the Center Moriches High School Auditorium on four Tuesdays, October 19 and 26, and
November 9 and 16, 1993. Application For Use of Sch. Dist. Facilities from Lamb's Chapel to Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., (June 14, 1993) (on file with author).
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all. In the end, its approach permits it to sidestep the single issue before us: Is the
Government's prohibition of solicitation on postal sidewalks unreasonable?1

The dissent there should not become the majority here; and the next "Lamb's
Chapel"'" case should not provide an opportunity to "create, in the name of the
First Amendment, a disincentive for the Government to dedicate its property to
any speech activities at all." 45 If the next case before the Court results in a ruling
that public schools must permit religious proselytization on its property, districts
may determine that the potential controversy outweighs any benefit and decide
that the time to close its doors altogether has come." The property would then
revert to a nonpublic forum, dedicated to education and education only. Then the
expressive activity of the Center Moriches community, as 1a47whole, would be curtailed. How can the First Amendment abide such a result?
The plaintiffs and the Court, after Lamb's Chapel, have ascribed to Center
Moriches a malicious intent in barring religious use from school district property. 1 How odd that that should be the epitaph of a school district, once opened
virtually twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week for its inhabitants' social,
civic, and recreational enjoyment, and now forced to keep "banker's hours."

143. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 733 (1990).
144. It seems highly likely that this issue of what speech is acceptable on public school property will be before
the Court again.
145. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 733.
146. It is axiomatic that the government need not keep a forum open indefinitely-it may close it at any time.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (citations omitted).
147. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1973). Writing for the plurality, Justice Blackmun
noted with respect to political advertisement on City owned buses:
in parcelThere could be lurking doubts about favoritism, and sticky administrative problems might arise
ing out limited space to eager politicians. In these circumstances, the managerial decision to limit car
card space to innocuous and less controversial commercial and service oriented advertising does not rise
to the dignity of a First Amendment violation. Were we to hold to the contrary, display cases in public hospitals, libraries,office buildings, militarycompounds, andotherpublicfacilitiesimmediately would become
Hyde Parksopen to every would-be-pamphleteerand politician. This the Constitution does not require.
Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
148. See Brief for Petitioners at 30, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141
(1993) (No. 91-2024) ("A more flagrant policy of viewpoint exclusion would be difficult to imagine."); Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,2149 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting "the apparent unanimity of our conclusion that this overt, viewpoint-based discrimination contradicts the
Speech Clause of the First Amendment").

